Speaking in a debate on the UK’s military operations around the world, James Sunderland outlines the proud record of military performance overseas over the past 30 years, but warns that the UK cannot afford to take its security for granted and calls for an increased defence budget to increase the size of the army, and improve its logistics capabilities.
James Sunderland (Bracknell) (Con)
Clausewitz famously wrote that war was a continuation of policy by other means, so it is entirely appropriate that we are debating global military operations in this place.
Over the past 30 years, the UK has had a pretty proud record of military performance overseas on a large, medium and small scale. From 1991 we had Gulf war I, Rwanda, Angola, Bosnia, Kosovo and Northern Ireland. Blair’s Chicago speech in 1999 set the case for international intervention beyond that: we had Gulf war II, East Timor, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and other expeditionary operations. There is, of course, no truth in the supposition that the UK forces deploy only in wars that they can win, but past performance is not necessarily indicative of future success, and in this era of global instability and competition, it is essential that we maintain sufficient forces to do the job in all five domains.
The integrated review gives the framework doctrinally while the defence tasks provide the direction, and I think that three of those are relevant to this debate: the first,
“defence, security and resilience of the UK”,
the fifth, “overseas defence activity”, and the seventh, “direct defence”. Back in my day, at Northwood Permanent Joint Headquarters, defence held the joint operational estimate of capability and readiness, otherwise known as JOECR. I think that today it is called the capability readiness assessment framework, or CRAF. It is classified secret, but I suspect that I know broadly what it says.
Intuitively, RAF and Navy capabilities are probably equipped to do the job with which they are tasked. Yes, we need more of everything—quantity has a quality of its own—but our ships, submarines and aircraft are good, supportable and modern. The elephant in the room is the land domain. My instinct, therefore, is that the CRAF is probably flashing red for land capability. Indeed, when we discuss defence in the House, operational capability is ultimately what truly matters. Yes, the Army has been bent out of shape for the support and gifting of capability to Ukraine—is this “a” war or “the” war?—but we must still hold at readiness the full suite of land capability for contingent purposes, and we must be ready for what comes next. If the MOD is required, under the defence tasks, to hold an armoured division at readiness, that is what this country must still be required to do. If it has not already been done, the MOD must first carry out a detailed estimate of exactly what is required now to get the 3rd (United Kingdom) Division out of the door. If it is necessary to increase the defence budget to 2.5% or 3% of GDP, then so be it.
The strategic defence and security review and the Army 2020 programme structurally altered the Army, moving it away from large-scale divisional deployments, so if we cannot deploy a division under the current construct, we need to put it back in place. We also need to get back the strategic enablers lost during the Army 2020 programme, not to mention the need for the full suite of strategic air and sea lift to be fully deployable worldwide.
Beyond increasing available manpower, equipment and capability within the field Army, we also need to enhance the logistic tail. We therefore need contingent stocks to be at readiness, including weapons, ammunition, spares and all supply natures, and not just training stocks. Supply lines need to be kept open with our suppliers and commercial partners, even when legacy equipment stops being made. As for equipment procurement—yes, let us purchase the best available, preferably made or integrated in the UK, but it needs to be affordable and scalable to meet the requirements. Exquisite exclusivity is fine but as an operator I would much rather have enough to satisfy all structures. Modular platforms that we can build for export must also be factored in.
Lastly, a fully equipped, manned, supported and sustainable Army costs money. If Defence tasks are serious about having a deployable division at readiness, the path to get there is non-discretionary. It is also clear that both NATO and the US allies expect that of us in this place. The world remains a dangerous, unpredictable place and the primary role of any Government, as we know, is to defend their people and their allies. It would be unwise to forget that.
Earlier intervention in the same debate
James Sunderland (Bracknell) (Con)
I do not want to put the Minister on the spot in the Chamber, but can he update the House on any efforts to reward that service with a continuous at sea deterrent medal?
The Minister for Armed Forces (James Heappey)
I will defer to my right hon. Friend the Minister for Defence People, Veterans and Service Families for his insight on that in his summing up. What I would reflect is that the Submarine Service takes an incredible pride in its work. Whereas Army, Air Force and surface sailors have rows upon rows of medals, all that matters to these crews is the colour of their dolphins, and they take enormous pride in that. I risk not being welcome in Faslane in case they want a medal as well, so all I will say is that what my hon. Friend has said is noted, and I will leave it to my right hon. Friend to come back to him on that specific point at the very end.
